Many
contemporary philosophers advocate the thesis that knowing implies knowing that one knows (KK thesis). In particular,, this thesis is explicitly argued for by Risto Hilpinen.
In this essay, I shall (1) briefly spell out the gist of the KK thesis as presented by Hilpinen, (2) review two intuitive responses to the KK thesis made by David Rynin, and note how Hilpinen handles these responses, (3) lend some support for the intuitiveness (prima facie plausibility) of Rynin's remarks, and (4) present an argument against the KK thesis here considered, and in so doing offer a counter-example to the KK thesis.
I
Hilpinen considers a KK thesis which presupposes (is founded upon) a "classical" definition of knowledge, i.e., a justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge. S knows that p if and only if (i) p is true, (ii) S believes that p, and (iii) S is completely justified in believing p.
Various alternative locutions may be substituted in formulating this account of knowledge. For example,
(ii) may be replaced by (ii,) S accepts p, or (ii~) S is sure of p.
(iii) may be replaced by (iii,) S has adequate evidence for p, or (iii_) S has the right to be sure that p, or (iii 3 ) S can give adequate evidence for p. Undoubtedly, these various alternative locutions differ in some rather salient respects. But Hilpinen is not too concerned about distinguishing these respects, nor shall I be.
Instead For the only defect with the KK thesis was (allegedly) the falsity of (B). Since the consequent of (B) has been added as a necessary condition of knowledge, the defect of the KK thesis is removed by definition. Surely there is not inconsistency here. Many people don't know who their ancestors were, although these ancestors are nonetheless these particular ancestors (with such and such offspring who had such and such offspring). Clearly then, many facts are facts regardless of somebody knowing that they (the facts) are so.
But isn't "John knows that p" a fact? Why then should this fact ("John knows that p") be different from other facts? Why must John know that he knows that p? Is "knowing" peculiar in the sense that whenever someone knows that p, he must also know that he knows that p? This is what the KK. thesis comes to. The KK., thesis points to an oddity in the logic of knowing.
Perhaps
the oddity is not restricted to the concept of knowledge. Perhaps, for example, other mental concepts share this alleged feature of knowledge. Consider the verb "to want." Might someone want p without knowing that (s)he wants p? Surely this is possible. David may want something without recognizing that he does. His want may be unconscious, as it were.
But this alone may not suffice to show that David doesn't know that he wants p. However, David may want p, without even believing that he wants p. Perhaps David comes from a strict Jewish family. He may want to marry a non-Jewish woman (due to unusual psychological factors), but not believe that he wants to marry a non-Jewish woman.
In such a case, David wants p but does not believe that he wants p.
Indeed, David may very well believe that he wants to marry a Jewish woman. If belief is a necessary condition of knowing, then David does not know that he wants to marry a non-Jewish woman, though he still may want to marry a non-Jewish woman.
As will be shown later, someone may believe that p, but not believe that he believes that p. So, someone may believe that p without knowing that (s)he believes that p (again providing that belief is a necessary condition of knowing).
If the KK, thesis is correct, then a restricted class of facts (e.g. *Kap*) are peculiar and distinct from most other facts in that knowledge that p requires that one know that one knows.
To push this point one step further, this peculiar feature of the logic of knowing does not even apply to "not knowing that p." Consider, the following statements: (x) S does not know that the barn is yellow, (y) s does not know that he does not know that the barn is yellow. (z) S knows that he does not know that the barn is yellow.
One might suspect, on first blush, that the truth of the KK, thesis would render (x) and (y) as sharing identical truth conditions. But this is not the case.
It is obvious that (y) and (z) yield a contradiction. But (x) and (z) are clearly compatible.
(x) and (y) are also compatible. Thus, (x) and '(y.) cannot have identical truth conditions. Furthermore, (x) may be the case without (y) being the case.
To see this clearly, consider the following case. Sam doesn't know that the barn is yellow. This is so just because the barn is, as it happens, red. Now, suppose Sam knows that the barn is red. Here is a case where (x) (Sam doesn't know that the barn is yellow), and (z) (Sam knows that he doesn't know that the barn is yellow), may obviously be compatible. 
IV
Given the JTB conception of knowledge, Hilpinen argues that the KK thesis is false (due to the falsity of (B)).
But after Hilpinen amends the JTB conception of knowledge, he arrives at a new version of the KK thesis (what I've been calling the KK^ thesis).
On the KK, thesis, the JTB conception of knowledge has a fourth condition added to it:
(iv) BaEap. From this new definition of knowledge, the KK, thesis allegedly obtains.
My present purpose is twofold. First, I want to argue that the KK thesis (from the tri-part, unaltered JTB definition of knowledge) is false because (A) is false. I will then argue that the falsity of (A) renders the revised KK thesis, i.e., the KK^ thesis, false as well.
I think that there are numerous cases, and ordinary cases at that, where someone believes that p, but does not believe that (s)he believes that p. There are at least two ways for someone to believe p without believing that (s)he believes that p:
Someone 'a' disbelieves that (s)he believes that p, or (6) Someone., 'a' withholds believing that (s)he believes that p.
Because an instance of (5) would be a powerful denial of (A), I shall employ an instance of (5) as my denial of (A). Of course, apart, from displaying a genuine instance of (5), I shall have to show that such a belief is consistent with the definitions of knowledge assumed by the KK and KK, thesis, in order to falsify the KK and KK, theses. But first, let me present an instance of (5 She is completely close-minded on these matters.
In our case, Tom believes that Joan is dogmatic and close-minded politically"! His behavior clearly indicates that he has this belief.
For Tom never brings up political issues with his wife any more (he did so a few times long ago, and she reacted as described above). He never tries to persuade her to vote for a non-Republican (although he does, on occasion, try to persuade other acquaintances to vote for certain individuals, sometimes Democrats).
In fact, Tom doesn't even advocate political awareness as a virtue in the presence of his wife. Nor does Tom question or criticize his wife's political dogmatism. This is because, as it happens, Tom believes that his wife is politically dogmatic (PD). Since Tom wants very much to avoid upsetting and arguing with his wife, he behaves as he does.
The twist in this case is that although Tom's behavior clearly indicates that he believes that his wife is PD, Tom does not believe that he believes this. In fact, Tom disbelieves that he believes that his wife is PD.
We may suppose, in this case, that Tom has deceived himself so that he does not believe that he believes that p, although he does believe that p.
Before I try to show that Tom's belief (that his wife is PD) is consistent with the definitions of knowledge given in the KK and KK. theses, two important points of clarification need to be made concerning our example.
First, someone might reject our example as a denial of (A). It might be argued that Tom does not disbelieve that he believes that p, but rather, Tom merely holds two contradictory beliefs. That is, Tom simply believes, on the one hand, that Joan is PD, and on the other hand believes she is not PD. (2) Tom believed all along that she was PD.
In coming to believe (2), it is obvious, I think, that Tom would be learning something from Bill; he might come to believe something which he had hitherto not believed. Tom might comment, at this point, "I guess I believed she was PD all along, but I refused to believe that I believed it." Perhaps Tom will even conclude that he had been deceiving himself all along, in order to sustain an image of his wife he found psychologically acceptable.
The point is simply that the case described is one, I think, where Tom believes that p, but disbelieves that he believes that p. Such cases are, I think, not uncommon.
A second objection to our example might deny that Tom's behavior is ever a conclusive indicator of Tom's belief.
That is, supposing that exhibited behaviour is logically distinct from belief, one might conclude that behavior is never a conclusive indicator of belief.
Thus, one might contend that although Tom behaves as though he believes that his wife is PD, he nonetheless does not believe that she is PD.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full scale analysis of the nature of belief. But whatever such an analysis entails, I think that a person's exhibited behavior will at least sometimes serve as a I have minimally supposed that behavior is sometimes an indicator of a person's belief. Perhaps the belief is a disposition to behave. Perhaps the belief, in conjunction with a desire, causes the action. Perhaps the belief is simply correlated with certain behavior, without any causal interaction at all involved. I have not committed myself to any one of these, or any other view concerning the relation between behavior and belief. I have, however, assumed that persons do have beliefs, they do exhibit behavior, and sometimes behavior is a reliable indicator of certain beliefs. Second, I have argued that many beliefs are unconsciously held. We are often unaware of many beliefs we hold.
But these beliefs are still full-blooded beliefs.
I think that this position is extremely plausible.
It is very unlikely that one is conscious of all the beliefs (s)he holds. At any rate, I admit that this assumption is working in our instance of (5).
To sum up, I have tried to explicate a case where someone (Tom) believes that p, but does not believe that he believes that p. The case presented is not unrealistic.
On the contrary, I believed that many instances of our case, and many slight variations on the main theme of our case, occur in the day to day lives of many people.
Now, is Tom's belief (that Joan is PD) consistent with the definition of knowledge?
That is, given the definition of knowledge, and given Tom's belief (in our case), might Tom know that his wife is PD? I shall proceed to consider whether Tom might actually know that P, first given the JTB conception of knowledge (as given in the KK thesis), then on the amended JTB conception of knowledge (as given in the KK^ thesis).
Before we proceed, we may note that if Tom may know that Joan is PD, given the JTB conception of knowledge and given Tom's belief in our case, then the KK thesis is false. This would obtain just because Tom would know that p, but not believe that he knows that p. Likewise, if Tom may know that Joan is PD given the amended JTB conception of knowledge, and given Tom's belief in our case, then the KK. thesis would be false for the same reason as the KK thesis.
The KK thesis defines knowledge as follows. Kap if and only if (i) p is true, (ii) a believes that p, and (iii) a is completely justified in p.
In our case, Even though Tom disbelieves his belief that Joan is PD, I think Tom may nonetheless be completely justified in believing that his wife is PD. Recalling the details of our example, Tom does not irrationally believe that his wife is PD. Rather, we noted that (1) Joan always votes Republican, regardless of who is running for election, (2.) Joan refuses to discuss candidates or issues, (3) Joan is often politically unaware, (4) she reacts in an emotional and almost fanatical way when it is suggested to her to vote Democratic, and (5) she is completely close-minded on political matters-she always sides with Republicans.
(1) through (5) seem to be a rather plausible candidate for a complete justification that Joan is PD. And if one thinks more information is required for a complete justification, it is clear that we only need to tack it onto our case. There is no problem with our position for that. Now, Tom is aware of these reasons (1) through (5), albeit in an unconscious way. These reasons serve as his reasons for his behavior. These reasons explain his actions.
It is because of (1) for which he believes something with reasons he can tell us about is to assume that reasons for which he believes something are. conscious reasons; and that assumption is a mistake.
The reasons for which people believe things are rarely conscious. People often believe things for good reasons which give them knowledge, without being able to say what those reasons are."
In our case,
(1) through (5) are Tom's reasons for believing that his wife is PD, although these reasons are not conscious reasons.
Tom's not believing that he believes that Joan is PD is irrelevant to Tom's being completely justified in believing that Joan is PD. So long as (1) through (5) completely justify Tom's belief, and function as Tom's reasons for believing that Joan is PD, then Tom is completely justified in believing that Joan is PD.
In our case, these reasons are unconscious reasons.
Furthermore, Tom disbelieves that he believes that Joan is PD, even though his belief that Joan is PD is completely justified.
If the satisfaction of (i), (ii), and (iii). ever constitute a case of knowledge, I do not see why our case should not. At any rate, Tom's belief (where he disbelieves that he believes) does not rule out his knowing that his wife is PD (given the definition of knowledge here assumed).
Recalling our case, suppose Bill comes along, and points out to Tom that (1) Tom believes Joan is PD, (2) Joan is PD, and (3) Tom is completely justified in believing that Joan is PD. This might well be a revelation to Tom.
For Tom knew all along that she was PD, he just didn't know that he knew it. Tom might say: "I guess I knew she was PD all along.
I just didn't know that I knew it." I submit that we have posed a genuine counter-example to the KK thesis. Tom knows that his wife is PD, but Tom does not know that he knows that she is PD.
To deny that KK. thesis, we need only show that our above case is consistent with (iv) BaEap. Given our above case, might Tom believe that his justification for believing Joan is PD is complete, and still disbelieve that he believes that Joan is PD?
As I argued before, Tom is completely justified in believing that Joan is PD. The question before us now is: Is our case consistent with Tom believing that he is completely justified in believing that Joan is PD?
We have noted that (1) beliefs may be held for unconscious reasons, and (2) beliefs may themselves be unconsciously held.
I think these two tenets enable us to render our case consistent with (iv). Tom believes that Joan is PD. His reasons for this belief completely justify his belief, but his reasons are unconscious ones. I suggest that Tora may also believe that his reasons completely justify him and nonetheless hold this belief unconsciously.
So, our case satisfies conditions (i) through (iv). Although Tom believes that he is completely justified in believing that Joan is PD, Tom is unaware of this belief. He has, perhaps, suppressed this belief for psychological reasons. And this illustrates how Tom's disbelief that he believes that Joan is PD is compatible with the satisfaction of conditions (i) through (iv). It is only when beliefs are identified with conscious beliefs that one might plausibly suppose that (iv) rules our case a non-knowledge case. So long as beliefs may be held unconsciously, as we argued they could, Tom may believe that he is completely justified in believing that Joan is PD, and concomitantly disbelieve that he believes that Joan is PD. I think our case (concerning Tom) captures just this sort of example.
Thus, Tom may disbelieve that he believes that P, even though (i) p is true, (ii) Tom believes that p, (iii) Tom is completely justified in believing that p, and (iv) Tom believes that he is completely justified in believing that p.
We may conclude, then, that the KK and KK, theses are false. This is just because both theses require (A) Bap -j BaBap.
Since the denial of (A) (at least one instance thereof) is compatible with the definition of knowledge given in both the KK and KK. theses, our single example (concerning Tom) serves as a ciunter-example to both the KK and KK. theses.
V
In this essay, I have tried to show that someone may believe that p, while nonetheless not believe that (s)he believes that p. Given what I take to be an instance of this claim, namely the example concerning Tom, I have tried to show that Tom may know that his wife is politically dogmatic, but not know that he knows this (given the conceptions of knowledge assumed in the KK and KK theses). 
